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Article 6

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
TACKING-The Supreme Court of Mich. has recently held in
the case of City of Howell et. al. v. Mc Keever (225 N. W. 884)
that where the line of travel on a piece of ground used for a public
way varies, the use of one piece of ground may not be tacked
onto the use of another piece, to make out the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of a public easement in an alley.
This action arose when the city and adjoining owners sought
to restrain the defendant from obstructing an alley by a proposed building. The alley was in existence for over fifty years,
and was used by merchants and by the public. The defendant
claimed the right to extend his building over the alley, and the
question then was whether the alley had occupied its present
location for the prescriptive period. The evidence showed that
the father of one of the plaintffs had once owned a building
adjoining the alley, and that the said building was farther back
from the alley than it was at the time this action was brought.
The evidence thus establishing that the line of travel was
changed, the above rule was announced.
Arnold Levandoski
VENDOR & VENDEE-In the recent case of Langley v.
Kirker, 225 N. W. 931 (Mich.) the contract for the sale of real
property permitted the vendor to mortgage the premises for not
more than 50% of the contract price to be paid, with further
provision that the vendee could in default of payment of the
mortgages, pay such mortgages and apply such sums as payments on the contract by the vendee. Further, that when the
amount due by the vendee shall be equal to the amount due by the
vendor on outstanding mortgages, the vendee shall be entitled
to a deed, with covenants by the vendee to assume payment of
the mortgages.
The vendor executed two mortgages prior to the execution
of the contract, with the consent of the vendee for his accomodation so that he might sooner obtain a deed. During the course
of the running of the contract the vendee defaulted in payment
and the vendor served notice of forfeiture. At the time the
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vendor was delinquent in payment of interest on one of his mortgages, and the vendee relies on the rule that a vendor is not entitled to a forfeiture when he himself is in no position to perform
by making a conveyance of marketable title in accordance with
the terms of the contract.
The rule invoked by the vendee was held not to apply for the
reason that the defendant vendee had not acted in good faith in
protecting his legitimate interests, in that the vendee defaulted
in his contract payment before the vendor ever defaulted in payment of interest on his mortgage. Moreover, the failure of the
vendor to pay such interest was directly caused by the failure
of the vendee to make payment in conformity with the contract.
In addition the terms of the contract afforded the defendant
vendee sufficient means of protecting himself. In the last analysis the defendant could show no injury suffered by himself.
Thus arose the rule that a defaulting vendee cannot defeat a forfeiture by availing himself of a default by the vendor when he
himself was responsible for the default.
Arnold Levandoski
FIXTURES-The case of Peninsular Stove Co. v. Young
et. al. (226 N. W. 225) was an action where the plaintiff by a cross
bill sought to enforce a mechanics lien upon an apartment building of the defendant's for the price of forty-nine gas ranges installed therin. Briefly the Michigan Mechanics' Lien Law provides that "every- person who shall in pursuance to a contract
furnish materials in or for building, altering, improving or ornamenting, or put in any house or building shall have a lien
therefor." The question then was whether these gas ranges so
attached became annexed to the real estate. The court approved
of the following three tests: 1-annexation to the realty. 2-the
application to the use or purpose to that part of the building to
which it is connected is appropriated. 3-the intention to make
the article a permanent accession to the freehold.
The controlling fact in this case was, that the building erected was an apartment house which would not draw desirable
tenants without such gas stoves, and it was held that such were
intended to become a part of the building, this being easily inferred from the foregoing facts. The ranges being fixtures and
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a part of the realty the plaintiff was entitled to a lien for their
value.
Arnold Levandoski
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY-In the case of
Akema v. Andruska 226 N. W. 246, which was a suit for damages
for breach of marriage promise, the defendant admitted the
promise but pleaded justification of the breach. The defendant
justified the breach by discovery of the fact of manufacture,
possesion and use of "Moonshine" whisky by the plaintiff. The
court instructed, and was upheld on appeal, that "if this woman
did manufacture, and had in her possesion, and used this illicit
liquor" as claimed by the defendant, "and she refused to give
it up and this defendant refused to marry her on thisaccount the
defendant is not liable." The verdict was for the defendant and
the plaintiff's counsel on appeal contended that the mere engagement in violation of a liquor law was not justification for
the breach but was effective only in mitigation of damages, or
in postponement of the marriage until the plaintiff gave up her
occupation in the manufacture of liquor. This contention was
held to be without merit and the instructions as given were
approved.
An interesting feature of the case is that the plaintiff denied
the making of "moonshine" whiskey and admitted the manufacture of "home brew", claiming that the defendant told her
to make it for the wedding.
Arnold Levandoski
CONSTITUTIONAL-Whole of statute must be considered in determinng its Constitutionality.
In the case of Eliason et al v. Wilborn et al, reported in 167
N. E. 101, the appellants filed their petition in the circuit court
of Cook County to cancel two certificates of title and for other
relief.
The appellants contracted to sell the land in question to
one Napleton subject to a $2700 mortgage and after trying to
collect the purchase price from Napleton they found that he had
absconded; that through forgery the names of appellants had
been signed to the warranty deed; and that a forged warranty
deed from Napleton to appellees had been filed'for record. De
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spite the protests of appellants a certificate of title was issued to
appellees. The prayer of appellants asks that the two purported warranty deeds be declared null and void and that the
registrar be ordered to cancel the certificates issued to Napleton
and to Wilborn, and that the title be vested in appellants free
from all liens and encumbrances except the mortgage stated
above.
Appellants insist that the Torrens Act under which the
land was registered is unconstitutional as depriving a person of
property without due process of law because they had no notice
so that they might have defended their title. The court says that
in determining the constitutionality of the Act it must be considered as a whole. The act is optional in the various counties
and no person is required to register his land unless he sees fit.
When he does- he voiuntarily submits his land to the operation of
the Act and is presumed to have notice of the various provisions
thereof and he cannot be heafd to complain that the act is unconstitutional. Therefore, appellant is bound by the section of the
Act which provides that the person taking land registered under
the Act shall not be required to inquire into the. circumstances
under which the previous holder was registered.
James A. Allan
AUTOMBILES-Ability to furnish satisfactory service is
question essential to be determined on application for certificate
to operate motorbusses.
In the case of Illinois Commerce Commission ex rel National Roadway Lines Inc. v. Wabash R. Co. reported in 167 N. E.
64, a certificate of convenience and necessity was granted to the
National Roadway Lines Inc. to operate a system of transportation of passengers and baggage by motorbusses between Chicago
and East St. Louis. Petition for rehearing was filed but was
denied and on appeal to the circuit court of Macon County the
order was set aside.
The ability of the corporation to furnish adequate and satisfactory service is a question essential to be determined upon
every application for a certificate. No finding was made by the
commission concerning the financial ability of appellant to perform the service for which it sought authority. The authorized
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capital of appellant was only $14,000, which had been paid in.
Its assets were $12,000 and the court found that it would require
at least $150,000 to furnish the service authorized by the order.
It appears that the incorporators and directors are men of good
financial standing and they agreed to increase the capital to
$150,000 or more if required but no contracts to this effect were
ever produced. As it stands the evidence showed merely a corporation with total assets of $12,000 authorized to perform a
service requiring assets of $150,000. Such a finding does not
justify the issuance of a certificate.
James A. Allan
TAXATION-Taxpayer appearing before the Board of Review and discussing raise of valuation could not complain thereafter that the valuation was raised without notice.
In the case of People ex rel Orrison, County Collector v.
Gibson, reported in 167 N. E. 32, there was an application for
judgment And order of sale against real prdpierty returned
delinquent for the nonpayment of taxes.
The appellant delivered to the assessor a schedule of his
personal property, the value of which the assessor fixed at
$8400. The board of view increased the valuation to $9400 and
the taxes were not paid. Appellant contends that the i"'rzae
in valuation is void for want of notice and hearing tupon the question as to whether the increase should be made. He was notified that he would be heard by the board on a certain day and
he appeared with his attorney two days after the appointed time.
The question of valuation was discussed and it was decided that
it should be raised. The attorney prepared a protest against the
action but instead of filing it with the clerk he indorsed it "filed
with the board of review" and retained it in his posession. It
appears that the higher valuation was not excessive. Upon
these fac ts the appellant's complaint that the valuation was
raised without notice to him and without a hearing upon the
question has no basis.
James A. Allen
HORTMAN-SALEM COMPANY, INC V. WHITE-Suppreme Court of Louisiana. June 17, 1929. Reported in 123 So. 715.
The question presented in this case deals in substance, with
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the time at which a person should record a mechanic's lien.
Should it be when all of the work is done, all of the minor defects
remedied which were overlooked in the general construction; or
should it be recorded when the general bulk of the work is completed; that is, when the work had been accomplished to such an
extent that, as far as the person holding the mechanic's lien is
concerned, the building upon which the work was done is tenable.
Walter William White was having the structure in question
built, and mortgaged it on July 23, 1927. The mortgage was recorded on July 28, 1927. Various liens growing out of the construction of the building, were recorded against it and the lot
on which it was built.
Plaintiff forclosed its mortgage, and after the foreclosure
sale the sheriff of the parish of Orleans ruled the mortgage and
lien claimants into the court for the purpose of determining how
Among the
the proceeds of the sale should be distributed.
claimants was the Vieth Supply Company, Inc. which was the
owner of a claim for $848.27 for material furnished or the construction of the building, and the Harry Brothers of Louisiana,
Inc. which was the holder of a claim for $259.29 for material furnished for the same purpose. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs over the claims of the last two mentioned parties,
and these latter claimants appeal.
At the trial it was admitted that the claims of materialmen
were due and owing, and that the material was furnished and used
in the building, and that the recordations were pnade on the dates
set forth on the mortgage certificate, but the plaintiff contended
that the claims of neither Veith Supply Company, Inc., or the
Harry Bros. Company of Louisiana, Inc., were not recorded in
time to preserve their claims and that as a result neither had a
right to claim against the mortgage.
No contract was recorded for the erection of the building,
and as a result the statute which provided that where no contract
ahd been entered into, or none recorded for the erection of a
building, the materialmen had 60 days to record their claims,
and if they did so a lien would be created for their benefit.
Now the liens of the materialmen who are putting in this
claim were recorded on January 12, 1928, but 82 or 86 days before
this a tenant had moved into the buildng. at which time the build-
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ing was considered completed. But the materialmen proved
that on November 1, 1927 some tiling was cleaned, that in January, 1928 the roof was found to have a leak in it and this was
repaired, and they claim that they did not have to record their
liens until the work of construction was completed, and that
it was not completed when the tenant moved in, because the roof
had to have -additional work performed on it, which was done
in January, 1928, as well as tiling cleaned, in November, 1927.
But the court held that some time must be fixed for the recordation of building liens to make them fully effective. True
it is that the statute fixes the time at 60 days for the recording
of the claim, where no contract had been made or recorded, from
the last labor done on the building or the last servcie or material
furnished, but within the contemplation of the statute, the last
labor is done and the last material or service is furnished prior
to the time the building is considered or treated as completed.
The correcting of defects which may appear from time to time in
the work after the building is completed or considered and treated
to be completed, are not to be counted'or deemed as part of the
labor contemplated by the statute, in fixing the time at 60 days
after the last labor is done, nor should services or labor furnished
for the remedying of defects later discovered be so regarded as
within the statute.
Thus we find in this case that where no contract has been
entered into, or where none has been recorded, the statute regulating the time in which a claim for work, labor or materials
should be filed, starts to run when the general bulk of the work
is completed, and that in cases of this type the statute starts to
run befroe a tenant moves in, because then the building is completed in the general sense of the word, and being completed,
the last labor or material must of necessity have been furnished.
J. E. Keating
BUCKLEY V. FEATHERSTONE GARAGE, INC.Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit. July 1, 1929. Reported in 123 So. 446.
Significant in the rules laid down by the court in this case
are the following propositions: "A motorists proceeding under
proper traffic lights and signals may assume that the signals are
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understood and will be observed by pedestrians." And "Less
care is exacted of a motorist proceeding under traffic signals than
where there are no signals".
The accident which gave rise to this suit occurred in the daytime at the intersection of two streets whose traffilc was regulated by signals.
The evidence showed that the defendant entered the intersection on the green light, which permitted him to proceed, and
that a few seconds after he had entered, the light changed to
yellow, which was a signal for caution, and for vehicles in the
intersection to get out of it as quickly as possible. The plaintiff
was standing on the curb on the side of the street which the
defendant's driver was approaching; and before the signal was
given for hier to proceed, she stepped out into the street and was
struck by the automobile which the defendant's driver was operating. The machine at the time was going about 15 miles an
hour, and the plaintiff contends that even if she did step out before the light gave her right to that the defendant was liable,
because the driver should have been looking ahead and seen her
step out from the curb, but the driver testified that he was looking
ahead, and that he saw the plaintiff, but that she was standing
on the curb, and that she suddenly stepped out in front of him
as he crossed the intersecting street, and that he had no opportunity to stop before he struck her, but that he stopped in a very
few feet after the accident. This testimony was found to be true,
and the court held that the motorist was not lible under the doctrine of the last clear chance where the pedestrian who was struck
entered the intersection before the traffic signal changed and
suddenly stepped in front of the automobile. The court also
said in regard to this question that if the defendant's driver had
seen the danger the plaintiff was in and had not stopped or avoided striking her, she could recover even though she was negligent
in being in the intersection, under the doctrine of the last clear
chance.
However, in this case the driver saw the plaintiff standing
on the curb, and had reason to believe that she would stay there
until the light changed, because a motorist rightfully entering an
intersection and proceeding under proper traffic signals at that
intersection may assume that the signals are understood and will
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These reasons, in addition to
be observed by the pedestrians.
the rule laid dowh by the court that less care is exacted of motorists proceeding under traffic signals than where there are no
traffic signals, caused the court to give the defendant judgment
in this case.
J. E. Keating
STATE EX. REL. BURTON, STATE ATTY. V. BARKER, CIRCUIT JUDGE-Supreme Court of Florida, Division
A, July 31, 1929. Reported in 123 So. 738.
Chesley A. Skipper was Vice President of the Highlands
Bank and Trust Company of Sebring, Fla., when it closed its
doors in February, 1929. In April the grand jury returned an
indictment against the said vice president for misappropriation
of the funds of the aforementioned bank. A motion was made
before the present defendant to fix a date for Skipper's trial for
the offense, but the present defendant refused to entertain the
motion, stating as reasons therefor that he was disqualified to
sit in said cause. An alternative writ of mandamus was then issued by this court commanding him to assume jurisdiction of
said cause and to go on with the trial, or show cause at a day
certain why he should not do so. A return was filed to the writ
stating that the judge was a depositor in the said Highlands bank
at the time it closed its doors, and for this reason he was disqualified from trying one charged with misappropiating its
funds.
The statute upon which the judge relied provided that no
judge in any court should sit in any case to which he was a party,
or in which he was interested, or in which he WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM BEING A JUROR by reason of interest, consanguinity, or affinity to either of the parties, nor should he
entertain any motion in such a suit other than to have the same
tried by a qualified tribunal
The demurrer to the return to the alternative writ was overruled and the judge held disqualified to hear such a case, because
lie was interested in the final outcome of the affairs of the bank.
If this were a criminal prosecution he would not be disqualified
because of a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the trial, but
being a depositor in the bank he would have such an interest in
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the conviction of the defendant as to disqualify him as a juror,
and since he would be disqualified as a juror he would also be
disqualified from hearing the case as a judge.
J. E. Keating
NUISANCE-OperatioA of junk yard on large scale in an
exclusively residential district, though a lawful business, held to
constitute a nuisance.
This was a suit to enjoin the defendant Henry Kemper from
conducting his business of junk dealer on the premises in question. The defendant purchased two lots adjoining the lot of the
plaintiff, on which he lived and gradually worked up a thriving
junk business."- He paid $1,000 for the one lot and $1,500 for the
other. His buildings valued approximately - $300. His lots were
fenced with high boards. The business grew until it brought
him $60,000 to $80,000 a year. He kept a machine in one shed
for breaking up the iron into pieces. Five men were kept busy
hauling, in motor trucks, the iron to and from the yard and in
breaking it up.
The Court said, "The business of the defendant is a lawful
business, and not a nuisance as such, but in our judgment its
nature, character, and magnitude make it so, when located in a
neightborhood otherwise exclusively residential. The operation
of the yard, together with its incessant noise and dirt is a nuisance
subject to abatement." Weishahn v Kemper et al. 167 N. E. 468.
Vernon Freed
NEGLIGENCE-Contributory negligence of a wife as gratuitous bailee held not imputable to husband, precluding recovery for defendant's negligent injury to husband's automobile.
The wife in making a left-hand turn properly circled the semiphore and waited at the center for another car to pass, when
the defendant negligently operating an automobile at an unlawful
speed of 35 miles an hour without having it under control, attempted to cut the comer without circling the center of the intersection in violation of Sec. 759 Par. D. of the municipal code
-thereby hitting appellee's car through no fault of his wife.
Appellee sued for damages of $500.00.
There was a verdict for plaintiff. The defendant appeals, the
question being whether or not the wife's negligence in operating
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appellee's car will be imputed to him without showing his wife
was acting as his agent at the time of the. accident. There is no
evidence in this case of an agency-the evidence showing she
was simply the gratuitous bailee of the appellee.
The Courts held in the majority of the earlier cases that a
b,ailee's negligence was imputable to the bailor; 13 Am. Dec.
464, Mass; 60 Am. Dec. 360; 49 LRA 322, Ill; etc. But the*
weight of authority is changing and later cases decide in favor of
the rule that a bailee's negligence is not imputed to the bailor
to preclude his recovery from 3rd persons who damaged the
article bailed; Alabama, Missouri, Conneticutt, New Hampshire,
W'.shington, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, NMew
Jersey, Illinois, Delaware so holding.
Without Indiana authority dairectly in point, as ruling precedent, we hold with the weight of authority, that bailee's negligence is not imputed to his bailor to preclude the later from recovery from 3rd persons who damage the article bailed."
It isn't necessary to prove that the wife was free from fault,
even though complaint avers she was free from fault. (Other
points have decided and judgment affirmed.) Lee v. Layton,
167 N. E.,--545-Indiana.
Vernon Freed
TAXATION-Board of Review held unauthorized to raise
assessment, in absence of showing notice to taxpayer of proposed increase.
In an appeal from the judgment of the county court ordering
sale of the appellant's land for delinquent taxes the appellant
alleged that it had paid the collector of county taxes all the legal
portion of the tax levied against its property, and that the unpaid
portion of the tax was-illegal on the ground that the assessed
valuation of the improvements upon the premises was arbitrarily raised by the Board of Review without notice to the objector, from the assessed valuation of $63,000 to $100,000.
Proof of notice was attempted by appellee by introducing
in evidence a registered return postal receipt signed by the agent
of the appellant. This point failed when the appellant convinced
the court that the agent was a doorman and was not authorized
to receive mail for it.
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The Board of Review has no power to raise the assessment
of a tax payer without notice, and the tax levied against the
appellant's property based on the excess valuation was void.
(People ex rel. Harding v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. 167

N. E. 96).
However, if notice to the taxpayer be given by the Board
of Review to the effect that he would be heard with respect to
a contemplated increase on a certain day, and the taxpayer appears and discusses the question of valuation with the local assessor, he is without right thereafter to complain that valuation
was raised without notice. (People ex rel. Orrison v. Gibson,
167 N. E. 32).
Norman J. Hartzer
USURY-Machinery and equipment are not "tools and implements of trade", the taking of security upon which for usurious
loan is a misdemeanor.
The appellant in the case of PEOPLE V. SHAKUN (167
N. E. 187-Court of Appealh New York) loaned a sum of money,
in excess of $200, at a usurious rate of interest, and took as
security for the loan a chattel mortgage on certain machines and
equipment used in and a part of the mortgagor's printing business. The appellee alleges that the appellant is guilty of misdemeanor as described in Section 240 of the Penal Law (Consol.
Laws, c. 40) which provides: "A person who takes security upon
any household furniture, sewing machines,--* * * TOOLS OR
IMPLEMENTS OF TRADE, * * * for loan or forebearance of
money, * * * conditioned upon a greater rate than six percent
per annum * * * is guilty of misdemeanor. The appelle's contention was upheld by the Court of Special Sessions (N. Y.) and
by the Supreme Court, Appelleate Division (N. Y.), but met
with revearsal in the Court of Appeals.
The Court was of the opinion that in the enactment of section 2400 of the Penal Law, the Legislature had conceived that
in the practice of exacting usury from large borrowers, there lay
no evil to be corrected, nor was there evil in taking security,
for the protection of the usurious loans, upon the personal property other than chattles necessary to the maintenance of life,
who by actual want are impelled to pledge these means of sus-
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tainance as security for loans of palty sums-these are th people
for whose protection this section was designed.
In a like manner the borrower is protected in the possession of his TOOLS or IMPLEMENTS OF TRADE, for they are
as "necessary for upholding life" (Henry v. Sheldon, 35 Vt. 427,
82 Am. Dec. 644) as are his household furniture or his clothing.
The costly machinery of an extensive business is not entitled to
this protection; only the tools by which an artisan earned a
livelihood are secured from seizure. It is in this light that the
phrase, "tools and implements of trade", referred to in this section is interpreted.
Norman J. Hartzer
INSURANCE-A nut flying off an automobile is not an
"automobile or substantial part thereof" under a policies covering
injuries to insured struck by an automobile. Harley v. Life and
Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 149 SE. 76.
Harley brought suit against the Life and Casualty Company
alleging that while walking on a sidewalk in the city Atlanta, an
automobile traveling at a rapid rate of speed, and that a nut on
the wheel of said automobile became detached and flying in a
swift and violent manner struck petitioner in the eye, and as a
result he lost the sight in his eye. He claimed damages under
the policy issued by the defendant, and the defendant denied that
it was liable under the policy.
The provision of the policy was, "If the insured be struck
by a vehicle propelled
or knocked down or run over
gasoline, etc. A nut off an automobile is not
by steam,an automobile or a substantial portion thereof, and therefor the
petitioner is not entitled to recover under the policy. 94 S. E.
843.
The plaintiff was the only witness who testified that he was
struck by the nut and his testimony construed most strongly
against him fails absolutely to show that the nut came from the
automobile. He testified that he did not see the nut come off
the automobile and did not know what had struck him until he
saw the nut on the sidewalk near him after he was injured. His
statement that it flew off the automobile is a mere conclusion
and not supported by evidence. It is just as reasonable to infer
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that the nut was lying in the street and that the automobile struck
the nut and put it in motion thereby causing it to strike the insured.
T. J. O'Niel
NEGLIGENCE-Contributory negligence of automobolists
in crossing collision does not bar recovery, but only mitigates
damages where the crossing signals were not given. Norfolk and
W. Ry. Co. v. Hardy, 148 S. E. 839.
John Hardy was killed by a train of the defendant railroad at
one of its crossings. It was shown by evidence that the deceased
was traveling on a road parellel with the railroad. For a space
of 50 feet before reaching the track, one on the highway could see
for a distance of about 550 feet down the track, and when within
20 feet of the crossing one had a clear and unobstructed view of
the track for 1,200 or 1,300 feet. The deceased was driving
about 5 miles an hour as he neared the track and almost stopped
when within 15 or 20 feet from the crossing, yet he drove on the
track in front of the approaching train, which he should have
seen and was killed. The evidence also showed that the train
failed to give signals as required by law in approaching the
crossing.
Section 3959 of the Virginia Code of 1919 decided the case
for the plaintiff. This statute provides that, "If the employees
in charge of any railroad engine or train fail to give the signals
required by law on approaching a grade crossing of a public
highway, the fact that a traveler on such highway failed to exercise due care in approaching such crossing, shall not bar recovery
for an injury to or death of such traveler, nor for an injury to
or destruction of property in his charge, where such injury, death,
or destruction results from a collision on such crossing between
such engine or train and such traveler or the property in his
charge respectively, but the failure of the traveler to exercise such
care may be considered in mitigation of damages."
T. J. O'Niel
STATE EX. REL. SCHWAB, PROS. ATTY., V. PRICE
ET AL-Supreme court of Ohio.
1. Corporations, Key No. 195XWord "stockholders" in corporate regulations providing that three-fifths of the stockholders
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shall constitute a quorum means stockholders per capata, not
stockholders in interest. (Gen. Code 8623-12).
This case arise as an action in quo warranto filed in the court
of appeals of Hamilton county brought by the state of Ohio on
the relation of the prosecuting attorney of Hamilton county
against the defendants who claim to have been elected directors
of the M. Werk company, an Ohio corporation.
The petition prayed that the defendants be compelled to
answer by what warrant they exercise the liberties, priveleges
and franchises of the office of directors of the corporation and be
required to show by what warrant they are conducting and controlling the corporate powers of the company.
The controlling facts of the case were not in controversy.
The M. Werk company, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of soap, had an authorized capital stock of 15,000 shares of
common stock all of which is issued and outstanding. After
having given due notice of the annual meeting of the corporation
to all of the stockholders, only 15 out of 25 of the members attended. When the meeting was called to order by the president
and the secretary called the role it was reported that only 7740
shares were represented and that hence there was no quorum.
The president stated to the meeting that under the regulations,
three fifths of the stockholders in interest, or stockholders owning
9000 shares, were required to be present to make up a quorum.
A motion to adjourn was made and lost. The president thereupon refuse4 to act as president and the secretary refused to
act as secre ary. Thereupon the defendants proceeded with the
meeting and elected directors, namely, the defendants.
Article one 6f the regulations of the M. Werk Co. read as
follows :-"Three fifths of all of the stockholders shall constitute a quorum."
The legal question hence presented is: Where the regulations
of a corporation provide that "three-fifths of all the stockholders
shall constitute a quorum", does this mean stockholders in interest or stockholders per capata?
Plaintiff contends that the share of stock and not the individual, is in all cases the unit by which corporation affairs are
goverened, where the word "stockholders" is used it refers to the
interest and not to the person holding the stock
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Under the Corporation Code of Ohio, section 8623-48, of
this enactmene reads as follows:
"The shareholders in person or by proxy at any meeting for
the election of directors shall constitute a quorum, but to constitute a quorum at any other meeting for any other purpose,
there shall be present in person or by proxy the holders of shares
entitling them to the exercise of a majority of the voting power,
or if each vote is to be taken by classes, the holders of shares of
each class entitling them to the exercise of a majority of the voting power of that class unless in either case the articles require a
greater or lesser number".
These specific regulations show that the word "stockholders", as regards to a quorum at a meeting for the election of the
directors, mean thei individual holders of the stock.
Therefore this court could not find an ambiguity concerning
the meaning of the word "stockholder". The rules and regulations of a corporation, when not in conflict with statuatory provisinos have all the force and effect of a contract between a corporation and the members, and between the members themselves.
Courts cannot reform the contract between these stockholders by
reading the words "in interest" into the regulations where the
statute has given them the power to make their own contract.
William Dore
MASTER XND SERVANT-Key No. 316.-Term, "independant contractor" presuposses the existence of binding contrac between the parties.
The plaintiff in this action is the administratrix of the estate of R. Snodgrass, deceased, and brought this action against
the defendant company and one L. Adams to recover damages
for the wrongful death caused by the negligence of the defendant. Petition alleges that Adams was an employee of the Cleveland Coal Inc. At the time of the accident he was delivering
coal from the yard of the defendant situated in the vicinity of
east Eighty Ninth stree and Woodland Avenue. While so on
his way a collision occured between the deceased and Adams
the result of whica caused the death of Snodgrass.
The question before the court was whether or not the evidence tended to show a relationship of master and servant be-
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tween the parties so as to determine the liability of the coal
Company to the plaintiff for the negligence of Adams who, the
I
defence claimed was an independant contractor.
The company owned no truck but engaged men who owned
their own trucks to deliver the coal at so much per ton. There
was no written contract but merely a verbal understanding. The
services of Adams was to be determined at the pleasure of either
party and that neither party could base a cause of action against
the other as for breach of contract. Because of these facts the
court gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the term "incontract between the parties for the breach of which a cause of
dependant contractor" "presuposes the existence of a binding
action arises". There can be no relationship of independant contractor without the existence of such binding contract, and it
is quite clear that no such contract existed between the parties
in the case at bar.
William Dore
LANG'S CREAMERY, INC. V. CITY OF NIAGARA ET
AL., Court of Appeals of New York, 167 N. E. 464.
In this action the plaintiff is a domestic corporation which
pasteurizes milk in the City of Buffolo, where it maintains a
pasteurization plant. It desires to sell its product in the City
of Niagara Falls, which city has an ordinance providing that "no
milk or cream shall be sold or offered for sale as pasteurized
milk or cream unless the same shall have been 'pasteurized' within the limits of Niagara Falls." The plaintiff has not applied
for a license because it has been informed that the ordinance will
be enforced against it, instead it brings this action to restrain the
city from enforcing its ordinance on the grounds that it is invalid
being an unreasonable exercise of the power of the city and
that the only purposes and effects of the ordinance are to arbitrarily discriminate against out of town dealers.
The defendant appealed from the decree of the referee that
the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of the municipal
power and' the findings of such official that the plaintiff did
maintain, as alleged, a proper sanitary pasteurization plant at
the City of Buffola. The Appellate Division not only upheld the
ordinance as a valid exercise of municipal power but also re-
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versed the findings of the fact, and made new findings that the
plaintiff had failed to establish that, if the bar of -the pasteurization ordinance were removed it would have had the right to
a permit to sell its milk in the City of Niagara Falls. In other
words the court found that the evidence supports the defendant's
assertion that the plaintiff violated the regulations of the state
department of health in maintaining its plant, and it would not
be entitled to a milk license in any event.
Although it litigated these questions on the trial, the plaintiff now maintains that these findings are irrelevant, and not
proper subjects of inquiry until it makes its application for a
permit to sell milk in the City of Niagara Falls.
This court in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division said in part "the plaintiff is-not in a position to question
the validity of the ordinance in this action". It should apply
to the local authorities for a license or permit to sell its milk
products. If such application is unreasonably refused, it would
then have a remedy through mandamus to right the wrong that
it had suffered. In such proceedings the validity of the ordinance
would be subject to attack. In this action the plaintiff is attempting to test the constitutionality of the ordinance before it has
shown that its rights are being affected thereby. "It has no
standing in court until it establishes that it is directly affected
by the enforcement of the ordinance". The judgment was affirmed with costs.
J. H. Flannigan
O'HAGAN V. FRATERNAL AID UNION ET AL.-Supreme Court of South Carolina. 141 S. E. 893 (1928).
Mr. W. A. O'Hagan was a member in good standing of the
Fraternal Aid Union and with such organization carried life
insurance amounting to one thousand dollars. His father was
named beneficiary, but because he had died before the insured
and no new beneficiary substituted, the policy provided that his
widow should be sole beneficiary.
Upon suit 1 y the wife for the amount due her under the
policy the question arose whether the administrator could hold
any of-the same due on the policy for the funeral expenses of the
insured? The circuit court declared that the appellant (the wife)
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was the sole beneficiary but, that the undertaker, who officiated,
should be paid five hundred dollars as a reasonable sum for his
services. From this holding the widow appeals.
The Supreme Court decided that "under the common law,
while the husband was liable for the funeral expenses of his wife,
the wife was not liable for the expenses of her husband". This
must govern since in this state there are neither statutes or decisions upon the question.
The respondents contend that the law implies a contract on
the part of the wife to pay for the expenses of her husband's
funeral, when his estate is not sufficient forthat purpose, as in
this case, and they cite the case of E. R. Butterworth & Sons
v. Teale.
"We have read that case carefully, hoping that it would
justify us in sustaining the judgment below, but we find no comfort therefrom. In that case the verdict of the jury required
the widow of the deceased husband to pay a reasonable amount
for his funeral expenses, and it was approved on appeal because
it appeared that the services were rendered with the knowledge
and consent of the defendant." (the wife).
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to show that the wife consented to the bill for funeral expenses, or that she even had knowledge thereof. Of course, if
the wife contracted to pay the undertaker she would be liable
therefor, and such a contract might be implied from her conduct;
but there is nothing to show on the part of the-appellant a contract, either express or implied.
"It regretfully appears", stated the court in reversing the decision, "that the undertakers who performed the last earthly service for Mr. O'Hagan will have to look to a greater Court than
this for their reward unless the appellant, in search for her reward in that Court, changes her position."
J. H. Flannigan

